The Composition of the Truth Commissions
The composition of the commission itself is fundamental to the truth outcome. The
commissioners are the truth managers and the staff are truth excavators. The managers decide
where to dig; the excavators are responsible for the manner in which they dig. Hopefully, they
dig patiently, carefully, and with attention to detail so that certain pieces of the puzzle are not left
hidden or extracted too brashly, sustaining them damage. The skills and sensitivities of those
who work with the various actors in the history to be clarified greatly affect the commission’s
success, the nature of the truth revealed, and the way the commission is perceived by the various
actors and the public as a whole. The goal is that the commission wins trust and commands
respect and authority so that its conclusions will be accepted and affirmed by all as the newly
expanded history (historical narrative) of the conflict years. It is crucial that this new, fuller truth
can be accepted by all. In order for reconciliation, the people must agree on the past to be able to
36work cooperatively together towards the future. These commission members have the potential
to write or rewrite the chapter of the conflict in the history books for the generations to come.
The credibility of the commission determines the persuasive strength of the truth revealed.
The power of the truth revealed affects what the people, government, civil society, and political
parties do in response. The potential that a truth commission has to help facilitate trust, to
acknowledge the victims, and to establish personal or institutional responsibility and justice is
great. To have this effect, it must first be recognized as a legitimate, impartial, and respectable
body by all parties to the conflict and by the general public.
Naming an impartial commission in the eyes of the country can be difficult as no person is
completely neutral. Their life experiences shape their frame of mind, priorities, sympathies, and
interpretations of history. The political and social climate in the country at the time of the truth
commission creation greatly affects what composition will be acceptable. In El Salvador where
the peace accords officially ending the war were signed only months before the truth commission
began its work, the wounds were painfully fresh, the country was still extremely polarized, and
identities were politicized according to party affiliation or ideological tendency. Neutrality did
not exist. It was impossible to find any notable Salvadoran person or public figure who could
lead the commission, never mind an entire Salvadoran commission and staff. Any Salvadoran
suggested would have been rejected by either the government or FMLN for having political
sways or vested interests in a certain outcome. The solution was to construct a commission of
internationals whose distance from the situation contributed to their relative objectivity. The
Salvadoran TC’s composition was novel in that it was the first to be made completely of foreign
nationals. The UN Secretary General appointed the three commissioners, Belisario Betancur
(ex-President of Colombia), Thomas Beurgenthal (ex-President of the Inter-American Court),
37and Reinaldo Figueredo (Ex-Minister of Foreign Relations for Venezuela) who were then
approved by both of the parties to the agreement on the commission establishment. They were
accepted by the government, FMLN, and the public as an external, independent authority
because they had no association with internal Salvadoran political entities.
The TC’s impartiality provided it with the minimal required legitimacy it needed to conduct
its search for the truth. Its international composition, rather than Salvadoran, meant that the
credibility of the truth is produced would at least be considered, rather than immediately
disregarded. However, their foreignness made Salvadoran people skeptical of their ability to
empathize. Salvadorans were hesitant to trust the Commission’s outsiders, and were reticent and
reluctant to come forward, especially at the beginning. Indeed, “commissioners and staff could
not fully comprehend the nuances of the locality — knowledge that national would have had to
their advantage.”73 Beurgenthal highlights the “general mistrust” of the TC on the part of the
majority of the Salvadoran population. 74 Gaining Salvadorans’ trust presented one of the most
difficult challenges. In order to encourage people to come forward to give their truth-testimony,
the TC maintained an “Open Door” policy in which anyone could walk in to one of the four
offices stationed around the country at any time to tell their story. They did not need to make an
appointment or call ahead. Additionally, the TC advertised in the newspapers and on the radio,
seeking to gain a more visible, prominent presence and legitimacy in the eyes of the public. In
the first two or three months — nearly half of their six-month investigation period — the TC was
able to gather very little information of value. 75 As Beurgenthal explains,
It should not be forgotten that the average Salvadoran had no reason to assume
that the Commission would in fact carry out an honest and serious investigation.
There had been many so-called “investigations” in the past, principally domestic
ones, and they produced little information and even less truth. More often than
not, they were publicity stunts staged by the Salvadoran government, frequently
as a result of U.S. pressure and timed so as to anticipate some action by the U.S.
Congress. Given this experience, Salvadorans certainly had no reason to trust
yet another commission, or three foreigners about whom they knew little. 76
38This shows that despite the efforts that the TC made to open up to the Salvadoran people, the
commission’s international make-up still impeded people’s trust of the Commission’s motives.
Consequently, also negatively affected were the extent of primary information it could gather for
its report and the cathartic effects of truth-telling that could have meanwhile benefited many who
were still suffering.
If a commission cannot get people to come forward to tell their stories in substantial
numbers, it cannot be sure that the testimonies collected are representative of the country and of
the historical truth. If a truth commission cannot complete its first, fundamental goal of
establishing the truth, it cannot call the entire country’s attention to the basic, sinister realities of
the conflict — what violence has been committed, to what extent it has been perpetuated, and who
is responsible. If no impressive truth report stirs the country upon release, it will not spur or
pressure the acknowledgement of crimes and their victims. In countries with corrupt judiciaries,
such as El Salvador and Guatemala, the justice system will not consequently be called to reform
in order to accommodate trials of human rights abuse. Even if cases are filed, most likely there
will never be enough political force to compel those cases to be brought to trial and to convict
the defendant perpetrators. A movement for justice is dependent on a previously established,
accepted, and grounded truth. This one example shows how a complete, credible truth is
absolutely essential for any true reconciliation movement to succeed.
A few months into the period of investigations there was an important shift in willingness to
participate in the TC and give truth-testimony. The Salvadoran Ad-Hoc commission, created to
review the human rights records of the officers in the military and recommend dismissal or
demotion of members guilty of violations, came out with an incriminating final report in October
of 1992. 77 It called for the dismissal of over one-hundred officers, including the Minister and
39Deputy Minister of Defense and the Chief of General Staff due to egregious breaches of human
rights. 78 The effect was to win confidence in the work of such commissions at the same time as
it diminished the power of the military institution. It was the Salvadoran people’s fear of the
military’s power and their impunity that had discouraged many from coming to tell their stories.
The very governmental institutions and the individuals responsible for many of
the most egregious acts of violence in El Salvador remained in place and in
power, which explains the fear of the vast majority of individuals who appeared
before the commission. 79
Once the Ad-Hoc commission’s report struck a huge blow to the prestige of the military
institution, people felt empowered to add their own truth to the growing pool of personal truths
that would help shape the collective, national historical truth. At that point, in contrast to just a
few months before, the international composition of the TC proved to be a critical reason that the
Salvadoran people could trust the independent motives of the TC’s investigation. Gradually,
more and more victims and survivors, in addition to a few perpetrators, started coming forward
to give testimony, affecting a greater cathartic influence on Salvadoran society.
The Ad Hoc Commission had proven to the country at large that the power and
control of the government and the military was beginning to weaken, and that
things were changing in El Salvador. Therefore, many more ordinary citizens
also came forward to provide evidence, still very fearful, but now with greater
confidence in the integrity of the process. 8°
As will be elaborated on further, the quality of truth established by the TC turned out to be
impressive relative to that of other truth commission investigations around the world. The
potential for reconciliation was allowed, first, by the airing of the truth and the disproving of
false rumors and systematic lies. The international composition of the Salvadoran TC was an
asset to building trust and gaining legitimacy from the Salvadoran public, despite the fact that
this trust was slow in coming. In the beginning it appeared that the international composition of
the TC was the crippling obstacle to gaining trust and access to the Salvadoran’s stories.
However, once the release of the Ad Hoc Commission report assuaged people’s fear of military
40power and built their confidence in these commissions’ punitive effect, they began going to the
TC in increasing numbers. Therefore, it is more accurate to say that it was mistrust of the TC
outsiders compounded by the people’s deep fear of the consequences of truth-testifying that
prevented progress during the first few months. While the nonnational composition of the TC
was an intrinsic aspect that affected the quality of truth produced, the people’s fear of the
military was an external pressure, rather than an internal weakness, which restricted (for a time)
the progress of the TC towards reconciliation.
Guatemala found itself in similar, although perhaps not as extreme, circumstances to those in
El Salvador when the CEH began its work. The country was divided and broken from suffering
civil conflict over the previous few decades. When the Parties to the CEH creation agreement
were writing the mandate, they wanted the commission to be made of Guatemalans.
Guatemalans should be the ones investigating their own past and presenting the truth of their
recent history to the rest of their people. As Christian Tomuschat, chair commissioner for the
CEH, explained, “one would…expect that the task of dealing with a criminal past would be
entrusted to citizens of the country concerned.’
,81
However, in order to guard the CEH from
charges of bias, the Parties decided to include an impartial international presence to provide
“balance” and legitimacy to the CEH. As a result, the Guatemalan CEH was unique in its
mixed-nationality composition: one international figure appointed by the UN Secretary-General,
•
a Guatemalan “of irreproachable conduct,” and a Guatemalan academic.
82
Christian Tomuschat
was designated as Commission coordinator on Feb 8, 1997 and, in turn, appointed Otilia Lux de
Cot( and Alfredo Balsells as the Guatemalan commissioners. 83
41The Guatemalan CEH’s mixed composition was successfully objective. The variety in
nationalities, discipline backgrounds, investigation approaches, and truth interpretations brought
many complementing perspectives and strengths to the table. In turn, the truth that was
established was not only impressively comprehensive, but was a landmark in the international
experience of truth commissions. Striking, daring, yet carefully methodical truth commission
reports, such as the CEH Memoria del silencio (Memory of Silence), have the most potential to
compel official acknowledgment of the crimes committed and innocent victims wronged and to
empower victims and civil society to pressure the government for redress and concrete reform.
It is important whether commissioners choose a social science or legalistic approach to truth-
finding. 84 Commissioners with legal backgrounds will draw up legal definitions of what
constitutes a violation of domestic law, international human rights law, and international
humanitarian law and then compare cases from the investigations, in search of those that qualify
as violations. 85 Social scientists, in contrast, tend to ask the hows and the whys. One possible
implication is that during testimonies, “statement-takers” of a more legalistic approach would be
more interested in facts surrounding the circumstances of violent incidents and more focused on
identifying the gravest of crimes. Social scientists would pay careful attention to the story
progression, the manner in which the individual tells the story, and the personal emotions that
come through. Social scientist ’statement-takers’ and report writers may come across as more
sympathetic to the horror of the human experience.
A commission composed of professionals from different backgrounds — lawyers vs. social
scientists — has the potential to cause conflict of priorities and perspectives. However, in
Guatemala the mix of orientations among commissioners (two lawyers and one social scientist) 86
and approximately 200 staff provided a most dynamic interchange. Through the variety of
42intellectual strengths, a more comprehensive interpretation of Guatemala’s recent past was
possible. For example, the CEH employed quantitative analysis to prove that genocide had
occurred in Guatemala. It showed that in several crucial regions rates of indigenous people
killed by the state were five to eight times greater then rates among non-indigenous people.” 87
Conversely, the report’s historical examination of the root causes of the conflict and the systemic
injustice that perpetuated it was a qualitative, social science-oriented analysis. As a result, the
truth that the CEH presented in its report was uniquely striking, comprehensive, and profound. It
is, in the words of Greg Grandin, an “impassioned search for the meaning of Guatemala’s
violence”88 and a “damning narrative that indicts not just the nation’s ruling elite, but its culture
and history as well.”89 The CEH report was a departure from the Salvadoran (and the Chilean
and Argentine) TC’s juridical-style conclusions about human rights violations committed, which
concentrated on the whos and whats. 90 The Guatemalan report presented plenty of scientific
statistical evidence, but also branched out, daring to answer the complex question of “why?”
The why — the racism, economic exploitation, and political exclusion of the vast majority of the
country - was a part of the truth that was taboo; it had never been uttered aloud by any official
body before. However, these systemic grievances were a fundamental source of distrust of much
of the population towards the government and, therefore, an obstacle to reconciliation. By
exposing and addressing these larger problems the government became accountable to fix them.
Civil society could also be more vocal and active in fighting these problems from their angle. Of
course real change in systemic patterns or structure must be set as long term goals because
revealing and recognizing their detrimental effects is only the first step. However, it is an
essential step for reconciliation at any deeper level.
Tags: Civil society, government, history, political parties