The Case of Civil Conflict in Guatemala
Like El Salvador, Guatemala was embroiled in a long, costly, internal conflict that was, at
least, partially rooted in the economic exploitation and economic injustice of a feudal-like
system. Authoritarian leaders had ruled Guatemala and protected the economic interest of the
landed elite and foreign land-owners until Guatemala finally elected its first democratic civilian
leader, Jose Arevalo, to office in 1944. From 1944-1954, Guatemala enjoyed ten years of
democratic rule that brought land redistribution and significant economic, political, and social
reform to the colonial-modeled systems of old. However these reforms were unpopular among
the Guatemalan economic elite and foreign corporation landholders such as the American-owned
United Fruit.
In March of 1954, the Guatemalan military, backed by the CIA, overthrew the democratic
Jacobo Arbenz government in a coup that ended Guatemala’s popular “revolution.” 66 The
following leaders re-instated rigid authoritarian-esque economic policy, revoking and reversing
Arevalo and Arbenz reforms, while holding elections that would qualify Guatemala as a
democracy in name. Opposition to the government’s policy rose with leftist guerilla insurgent
groups that first organized during the early 1960s. The guerrillas were all but crushed by a
military counter-insurgency reaction in the 1960s. The Guatemalan government, as well as the
US government in 1954, had framed the “threat” as a communist one, in the context of the Cold
War. 2
2
In reality, these first “guerrillas” who organized the insurgency in the 1960s and reorganized in the 1970a were ex-
military soldiers or officers who had defected from the Armed Forces. The Guatemalan military has a history of
factions; these men constituted one such faction that broke from the military once it became disillusioned by the
corruption in the institution.
32The guerrillas regained strength again by the mid 1970s, this time with critical support from
mobilized indigenous Mayans, determined to fight against the systematic racism,
marginalization, and poverty they suffered. The Maya make up over half of Guatemala’s
population. The bloodiest, most gruesome years of the war came in the early 1980s under
General Romeo Lucas Garcia and General Efrain Rios Montt, the notorious conceiver of the
scorched-earth campaigns in indigenous Mayan villages. The anti-guerilla counterinsurgency
took on a distinctly racist tone towards the end of the 70s and after. Massacres, disappearances,
rapes, and tortures of indigenous people were strategically carried out in order to “break the
popular base of the leftist guerrillas,” or, perhaps more accurately, terrorize the indigenous
population back into fearful subordination within the traditional system that benefited the rich
and exploited the poor, rural Maya. Peace talks began in the form of a national dialogue in 1987
after a return to civilian rule two years earlier. In the early 1990s the “Oslo process” succeeded
in producing a slow series of peace agreements between the Guatemalan government and Unidad
Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) guerrillas, mediated by the UN’s Jean Arnault.
The long peace negotiation process finally culminated in official end to the civil conflict on
December 29, 1996 with the Agreement for a Firm and Lasting Peace. The human loss of the
thirty-six year war was devastating: 200,000 deaths and disappearances, tens of thousands of
refugees, and a million internally displaced people in a country with only 12 million people.
The establishment of Guatemala’s truth commission was, like El Salvador’s, negotiated
between the parties to the peace agreements as part of the accords. On June 23, 1994 the URNG
and the Guatemalan government created the “Agreement on the establishment of the
Commission to clarify past human rights violations and acts of violence that have caused the
Guatemalan population to suffer.” 67 This truth commission was given the official name la
33CornisiOn para el Esclarecimiento HistOrico (the Historical Clarification Commission, hereafter
CEH). The 1994 agreement clearly states the CEH’s primary purpose: “To clarify with all
objectivity, equity and impartiality the human rights violations and acts of violence that have
caused the Guatemalan population to suffer, connected with the armed conflict. “68 Towards the
ideal of reconciliation, the truth commission is established on the basis of the Guatemalans’
“right to know the whole truth” and with the expectation that it will promote a “culture of
harmony and mutual respect.” 69 The parties express their “wish to open as soon as possible a
new chapter in Guatemala’s history which…will…help lay the bases for peaceful coexistence
and respect for human rights among Guatemalans.”7° Despite their different political interests,
the Parties compromised in order to form this truth commission. From the beginning, the URNG
supported the idea of a truth commission and finally convinced the government to negotiate. The
government decided that it would be beneficial because they realized it was important for the
country to perceive them each as working towards bringing peace, stability, and reconciliation.
It remains to be seen later in the paper what the outcome was of this CEH.
According to this agreement, the commission was to draw up a report that contained their
findings and factual, objective conclusions regarding the events and the factors (both internal and
external) that led to their occurrence. The recommendations to be made by the commission must
“encourage peace and national harmony in Guatemala” and must include specific “measures to
preserve the memory of the victims, to foster a culture of mutual respect,” and strengthen human
rights observance and democracy. 71 This mandate included elements that are clearly identified
with national reconciliation. The CEH’s mandate, negotiated between the two parties to the
conflict, was considered weak, as the government surely made its existence conditional on very
limited powers and a restrictive time frame. However, its resulting conclusions were striking and
34its effects were surprisingly powerful. As Audrey Chapman and Patrick Ball declared, “the CEH
model proved to produce a more complete, consistent, and coherent report than any other
commission to date.”72 The following will analyze how well this seemingly restricted
Guatemalan Historical Clarification Commission and the similarly mandated Salvadoran
Commission on Truth were able to cope with such daunting missions and the overarching end-
goal of fostering national reconciliation.