The Case of Civil Conflict in El Salvador

El Salvador has been plagued since colonial control by severe inequity in land distribution
and access to economic resources. Rigid economic inequality spurred leftist guerrillas to
organize and begin uprising in the late 1970s against the political and economic system that
benefited and protected the economic interests of the landed elite. By 1980, the government had
29launched a full, strategic counter-insurgency campaign against the Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front (FMLN). Backed firmly by the US government who contributed over six
billion dollars of military and economic aid to the Salvadoran government and armed forces, the
Salvadoran military was able to continue their fight against the Soviet- and Cuban-backed
guerillas for twelve years until peace was finally negotiated between the warring parties with the
assistance of a UN mediator. Over 75,000 people, mostly civilians, were killed and over 1
million (including over 300,000 refugees) were displaced. The Chapultepec Peace Accords of
January 1992 ended the civil conflict and began a long process of societal and institutional
reconstruction.
One of the accords reached between the Salvadoran government and the FMLN in the series
of agreements leading up to the final Chapultêpec signing provided for an official truth
commission that would bolster the post-conflict national reconciliation process. The April 27,
1991 Mexico Peace Agreement’s “Provisions Creating the Commission on Truth” (named for the
site of the negotiations) outlined the motivations for, functions, and powers of a truth
commission to be run by the United Nations.6° The proposed truth commission would
investigate “serious acts of violence which have occurred since 1980 and whose impact on
society urgently requires that the public should know the truth.”61 By acknowledging the
silenced victims and disclosing the reality of the violations of human rights during internal
conflict, the truth commission would ultimately seek to foster mutual understanding and
consensus and, eventually, trust between all sides involved. The parties clearly stated their two
goals for the Commission to promote national reconciliation and to uncover the factual truth of
the nature, causes, and societal impact of the violence during the conflict:
The Commission shall take into account:
30a) The exceptional importance that may be attached to the acts to be
investigated, their characteristics and impact, and the social unrest to which they
gave rise; and
(b) The need to create confidence in the positive changes which the peace
process is promoting and to assist the transition to national reconciliation. 62
The fact that both parties explicitly supported the truth commission as a reconciliation initiative
and agreed to its freedom to investigate a wide variety of serious crimes was significant gesture
of mutual commitment that boosted the legitimacy of each party and the credibility of the truth
commission even before its work had begun.
On July 15, 1992, several months after the signing of the Chapultepec Peace Accords, the
actual ComisiOn de la Verdad para El Salvador (Commission of the Truth for El Salvador) was
formally established and began its enormous and weighty task with only a six-month period in
which to conduct its investigations. The Salvadoran Truth Commission (hereafter TC) was
unique because it was the first to investigate a certain country’s civil conflict while being
sponsored, paid for, and staffed by the United Nations.63 The commission was made of three
commissioners and a staff of 20-30 lawyers at any one time: lawyers, sociologists, forensic
anthropologists, and social workers from Latin America, Europe and the United States. 64 It was
charged to investigate the entire twelve year civil war period, but possessed no juridical powers
or powers of subpoena, search, or seizure. The commission was to produce a report detailing the
conclusions reached in their pursuit of “the complete truth.” 65 In the report they were to include
recommendations for reforms and reconciliation initiatives that would be binding to the parties.
As the commission quickly found, the fresh wounds of the horrors of El Salvador’s civil war, the
distrust that perpetuated beyond the proclaimed peace of 1992, and the sharply polarized
organization of society and politics, governed by the power to instigate fear, would critically
challenge the possibility of both of the Truth Commission’s goals.

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