INTERNATIONAL FUNDING SOURCES
The CEH had another source of external advantage that was fundamental not only to the
success it had in producing the truth, but to the Commission’s existence: international funding.
Without funding, a truth commission cannot do any of its work toward truth and reconciliation.
International sources were responsible for financing the vast majority of the CEH’s work
because the Guatemalan government had decided it was not its national or political priority to
fund its country’s own truth commission. The facts that the government did not consider it their
responsibility to fund the CEH and the mandate did not specify a way in which to acquire
funding could have been detrimental. MINUGUA (the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala)
was generous to donate enough to provide for an Executive Secretary, a typist, a driver with a
car, and three little office rooms to start off its mission. 135 However, the Guatemalan CEH was
not a UN endeavor.
The CEH launched a private campaign to raise enough money to sustain a commission of
sufficient staff, resources, supplies, and transportation that would penetrate deeply into the
country. The Commission needed the necessary financial support to conduct a concentrated
investigation into 36 years of civil conflict within a mandated one-year period. Its appeal was
swiftly answered by the governments of the Scandinavian countries, the United States, and
Canada. 136 A few other nations signed on to help to a lesser degree after this initial wave of
principal commitment, though no Latin American countries (besides Guatemala itself) were to be
counted among this final list of contributors. 137 It took months to persuade the Guatemalan
60government that it was essential to the country’s own interests, to contribute financially to their
own truth commission. 138 In the end, the commissioners were able to raise $9.5 million dollars
to fund the complex, multifaceted project. Compared to the funds available to commissions in
the past, this was an extensive amount. However, considering the sheer length of the conflict
period, the immense death toll and scope of suffering throughout the country, and the convoluted
conflict dynamics that the commission had to investigate, the $9.5 million was by no means an
ample amount of funds. In the end it provided for the necessities, but during the process the
level and sources of funds fluctuated, at times threatening financial collapse. 139
El Salvador, on the other hand, received what appears to be significantly less money for its
truth commission: $2 million. Compared to other truth commissions, this was still an
advantageous amount of funds. El Salvador was a smaller country than Guatemala, in every
sense. But the main advantage was the added element of security to their funding: the
Salvadoran Commission on the Truth was a UN initiative with a reliable UN pledge of financial
backing. Energy and time was not wasted fundraising or worrying about how to keep the
organization running, as in the CEH experience. United Nations sponsorship of the TC benefited
the consistency and degree to which the Salvadoran commission was able to investigate grave
human rights violations committed during la Guerra sucia. Still, one wonders if the donors were
selling the TC short by funding only a minimalist, six-month investigation of 12 years of civil
conflict. On balance, financially involving the international community in the Salvadoran and
Guatemalan post-conflict truth and reconciliation efforts was crucial to their investigation
success and proved to be instrumental later in receiving international and national-level
recognition, legitimacy, praise, and leverage for national reforms
Tags: investigation, Scandinavian