Implementation of Punishment and Justice Initiatives: El Salvador
There has been some progress in the purging of the corrupt rights abusers in the military and
public service who appeared on both the TC’s list of perpetrators and on the Ad Hoc’s list of
recommended individuals for dismissa1. 216 These officers appeared first on the list of the Ad
Hoc Commission and, thus, the Ad Hoc Commission, rather than the TC, is primarily credited
for applying pressure to the institution for their removal.
83While the Truth Commission was at work, the Ad Hoc Commission, charged with
conducting investigations deep inside the military, came out with its report and a sweeping call
to purge 103 officers from the institution. By the time the Truth Commission report was
released, several perpetrators it named already appeared on the Ad Hoc Commission’s list.
However, the Truth Commission report was crucial in increasing the pressure on President
Cristiani to confront the military regarding the remaining fifteen high command officers from the
Ad Hoc’s list and finally dismiss them. 217 President Cristiani informed the United Nations in
July of 1993 that every individual named in the Ad Hoc report would be removed by the end of
1993, including infamous figures like Generals Ponce, Zepeda, Rubio, and Vargas who had
already resigned or been dismissed. 218
Despite the initial encouraging removal of these generals from the military, many of the
perpetrators named in From Madness to Hope have retained high-level governmental
positions. 219 The legislature failed to follow the Truth Commission’s recommendation to draft
into law a ten-year ban from any public or political position for individuals found responsible in
its conclusions for egregious breaches of human rights.
220
Consequently, soon after losing their
military positions for participating in the murders of several civilian mayors, Joaquin Villalobos
became leader of the Partido Democrata and Ana Guadalupe Martinez secured her seat as Vice
President of the Legislative Assembly. 221 In the same way, former defense minister, General
Ponce, was appointed head of the AdministraciOn Nacional de Telecomunicaciones, and
Mauricio Gutierrez won nomination to the OAS Inter-American Judicial Committee.
222
The fact
that these gross offenders were handed replacement positions by a government that purported to
pursue reconciliation, directly undermined the meaning of reconciliation. The truth
commission’s intended punishment — removal from the military institution — was not allowed to
84be a manifestation of justice. Instead, it was merely a temporary inconvenience before the
government found new, equally lucrative and prominent, positions for them. For victims in wait
of reparations, social services, and basic recognition, this propping up of their perpetrators by a
government that claimed to be pro-reconciliation was another slap of injustice.
In addition to the troubling reappearance of old military faces wearing new hats of
responsibility, the removal of civilian officials from their positions has been slow-moving. In
fact, it was a more sluggish process than retiring corrupt officers from the military.
223
Mauricio
Gutierrez Castro, identified as having purposely obstructed justice in the El Mozote case,
remained President of the Supreme Court until July of 1994. 224
Impunity remains a severe obstruction to justice in El Salvador. There has not been one
conviction of an accused perpetrator. Cases for the murders of Monsignor Oscar Arnulfo
Romero y Galdamez5 , Ignacio Ellacuria, Armando Lopez Qunitana, Joaquin Lopez y Lopez,
Segundo Montes Mozo, Ignacio Martin Bar() and Juan Ram6n Moreno Pardo, and Elba Julia
Ramos and Celina Maricet Ramos have been left without resolution or punishment of
perpetrators. A coalition of NGOs together filed a case against high-ranking military and
civilian officers accused of ordering the infamous 1989 murder of the six Jesuit priests 6 with
their housekeeper and her daughter. 225 In 2001, the third Magistrate’s Court of San Salvador
dismissed all charges against them. 226 While impunity continues inside the country, a case in the
United States brought by three Salvadoran torture victims against two generals of the Salvadoran
military has brought flickers of hope to those in El Salvador.
227
The US court ruled in favor of
5 Violence against opponents by agents of the State, Death Squad Assassinations, Illustrative case #1. “Cases and
Patterns of Violence,” Death Squad Assassinations. From Madness to Hope: the 12-year war in El Salvador: Report
of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, 1993.
6 Violence against opponents by agents of the State, Illustrative case #1. “Cases and Patterns of Violence,” Death
Squad Assassinations. From Madness to Hope: the 12-year war in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on the
Truth for El Salvador, 1993.
85the Salvadoran victims and fined the defendants, all residents of the US, a punitive compensation
for the crimes and pain they had inflicted. 228
Unlike the active civil society of Guatemala, the lack of visible, vocal demand for justice
from the civil society sector in El Salvador has failed to put pressure on the government.
Salvadoran human rights groups severely lack technical resources and, therefore, the technical
capacity that helps organize and mobilize people, create a stronger network of NGOs, and
ultimately let demands be heard. 229