Immediate Reactions to the TC Report
The March 15, 1993 publication of the Truth Commission Report, From Madness to Hope,
sparked major political controversy. Commissioners claim that the truth-finding/telling efforts
followed by the Commission report had a cathartic effect on the victimized population. Human
rights groups praised the exposing of names. The FMLN fully supported the report, while the
Supreme Court, the executive branch, and the Salvadoran armed forces denounced the report.’
86
The armed forces condemned the report as “unfair, incomplete, illegal, unethical, partial, and
disrespectful.” 187 On March 18 th , in Salvadoran President Cristiani’s public address in response
to the report, he called for erasing, eliminating, and forgetting everything of the past, rather than
upholding the truth established and emphasizing the importance of further efforts to seek
redress. 188 Eight days after the release of the TC report, General Ponce contended bitterly that it
intended to “defile the honor and dignity of the armed forces and convince the public that the
military had systematically violated human rights.’
,189
On March 26, the Supreme Court of El
Salvador criticized the Truth Commission’s recommendation to remove such corrupt, political
pressure-prone judges as “extreme and tendentious.” 19° Sadly, media coverage of the
presentation and content of the TC report was very limited at the national level due to strict press
censorship. 191 Internationally, the TC report attracted limited, short term coverage. 192
77Five full days after the presentation of the report, President Alfredo Cristiani called for a
blanket amnesty for all individuals charged with serious acts of violence. 193 His response was in
direct reaction to naming names of perpetrators — exposing military members, governmental
officials, guerrillas, and civilians and condemning the military and governmental institutions to
which the majority belonged. While the government had previously supported identifying the
military and civilian institutions’ “rotten apples,” it now reacted in extreme defiance. Although
the President emphasized the need to forgive, the victimized population and human rights groups
took this as an insulting gesture that played to the desires of the military instead of, firstly,
recognizing the victims and admitting to the wrongs done against them. “Political concerns
under the guise of ‘reconciliation’ … were given greater importance than the rights of the
victims and society’s need to address the past.
“194
The measure was rushed through the
Guatemalan legislature to be put into action, further undermining the victimized people’s trust,
polarizing the country, and the entire process of reconciliation, which the government claimed to
support. Such an across-the-board amnesty was a crippling rebuff that injured victims’ dignity
and their hope for justice.
In reflection of this turn-of-events, many wonder if the TC should have anticipated such a
reaction from the government, pressured by the military, and, thus, not tried to push anything
that could backfire. It is ironic that part of TC’s mission was to address the immense problem of
impunity in El Salvador, but yet its unintended effect was its implementation. Still, the amnesty
did not nullify the TC’s work or negatively affect the report itself. 195 Whether or not the names
of perpetrators had been included in the report, impunity would have won out at that time in El
Salvador. Even without the amnesty it is unlikely that a few, if any, individuals would have (1)
been brought to trial in Salvadoran courts, and (2) convicted there with an appropriate punishing
78sentence. The effect was to release a few individuals already convicted while morally
stigmatizing many more individuals that represented entire institutions.