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Jefa de InvestigaciOn de la Oficina de Enlace de los departamentos de Zacapa, Chiquimula, El
Progreso e Izabal, ComisiOn para el Esclarecimiento HistOrico
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Licenciado en ciencias de la comunicaciOn, Area de comunicaciones del Institute de Derechos
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Monday, April 5, 2004: Marco Tulio
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during March 2004 Trip to Guatemala: “The Challenges of Reconciliation in Guatemala”

Societies that are trying to overcome the pain, division, and distrust of conflict understand
that reconciliation cannot be a short-term goal. Indeed, there is a “road to reconciliation.”
Reconciliation is a process, a long road along which to travel. Truth commissions are easily
criticized for a weakness in not being able to bring about reconciliation. However, one must
tame one’s expectations of any reconciliation initiative because “reconciliation” is broadly
defined and ambiguous as a concrete goal. Expecting or even hoping that a truth commission
will cause reconciliation is an expectation that is bound to be unmet. It is not realistic to hope
that a truth commission, or any one measure enacted for reconciliation, will necessarily bring
about reconciliation. While truth commissions are not necessarily the “road to reconciliation”
they are an important vehicle for making progress on this road. Truth commissions certainly
have positive effects towards reconciliation. Without a thorough, broadly-scoped investigation
and airing of the truth, a society that has kept painful secrets of abuse hidden inside the archives
92of the military and inside the heavy hearts of the victimized people will be burdened by its past
as it struggles to march forward.
Truth commissions are not perfect. Nor are the political, social, and situational contexts in
which they are established ideal. The cases of the Salvadoran and Guatemalan Truth
Commissions are by no means exceptions. Much of the political power of government
perpetrators remained intact in both countries, severely limiting the extent of the truth
commissions’ progress toward reconciliation. Nevertheless, the value of their truth-telling and
truth-revealing capacities and their recommending authority towards the goal of reconciliation is
real.
Truth and the Truth Commissions have had an impact on reconciliation in El Salvador and
Guatemala in many different ways. Firstly, they have broken the silence that before was
impenetrable. Stemming from the Peace Accords which negotiated for the future, they began a
dialogue about the past. Victims told personal accounts of violence and suffering aloud for the
first time, reclaiming their voices. They spoke of an inherent need to tell their story, a need that
was suppressed for so long. Destructive secrets, legacies of denial, and direct lies of the
“authorities” were finally disproved. The victimized were empowered while the perpetrators’
prestige was newly threatened. The truth upheld meant victims’ dignity resurrected. Truth
commissions begin the sharing and communication that, if it takes root, will continue in and
between communities, beyond the truth commissions’ time to empower people further. A
growing Guatemalan civil society comes from empowered people speaking up, organizing, and
mobilizing for justice at long last.
Secondly, the TC and CEH began the process of leveling government-to-people power
relationships that may make way for cooperation and trust. The truth commission work has
93revealed the strategies and criminalities of the past to such a degree that the institutions that
previously governed from above by fear are fully exposed and vulnerable in a way they never
have been before. Human Rights groups in El Salvador and the whole of Guatemalan civil
society are holding the government and guerilla Parties accountable to the TC and CEH
recommendations. Reconciliation requires the building up of trust across bitter or painful
divisions. Trust of the people is beginning to be a necessary element for legitimacy to govern in
both countries. Recently in the November of 2003 presidential election, the country of
Guatemala rejected FRG candidate Efrian Rios Montt, the dictator who directed the military to a
strategy of massacres and scorched earth campaigns during the bloodiest conflict years.
Thirdly, the Guatemalan CEH put pressure on the government to acknowledge the victims
and crimes through apology and compensation. Although Arzlis reaction to this demand was
cold, the following President already showed improvement on his predecessor. Although
questionably sincere at first, President Portillo made public apologies and an appeal for pardon.
Even if Portillo was not able to make much progress implementing the recommendations of the
CEH as he claimed he would do, he recognized the actions and reforms recommended in the
report as the right ones to follow to reach reconciliation. His official support of the CEH and its
recommendations showed his backing of the specific interpretation of “reconciliation” policy as
one that favored remembrance of the victims and seeking justice, rather than forgiving and
forgetting.
As a fourth area of impact toward reconciliation, in both El Salvador and Guatemala, the
Truth Commissions were responsible for initiating visible and tangible reconciliation measures
for the people. The Monument of Memory and Truth now stands erect in a central park in the
Salvadoran capital, displaying the names of 25,000 victims of the conflict for all to see.
94Guatemala now commemorates February 25 th , the anniversary of the presentation of the CEH
report, as a national holiday — the Day of Dignity for victims. Salvadorans celebrate an annual
`Festival of Truth’ each March in the capital on the anniversary of the Commission on the
Truth’s report public publication. In Guatemala, the government’s forensic anthropology team
has begun to work alongside three well-experienced forensic anthropology NGOs who steadily
continue to exhume the remains of conflict victims from clandestine graves. They work to
record concrete evidence of the crimes committed, hopefully for future trials, and provide a vital
sense of resolution and reconciling for the families of the victims exhumed.
Fifth, the TC and CEH have made important contributions to the need for justice in order to
completely reconcile. Despite the fact that reparations programs have not yet been implemented,
the commissions took the important step to identify that financial compensation and social
services were imperative components of restorative justice for the victims and their families.
Dismissal of the human rights offenders from military and governmental public service was,
although not through the courts, a concrete form of punishment. The naming of perpetrators in
the context of egregious, illustrative abuses in the Salvadoran Truth Commission constituted
significant moral punishment and rejection of impunity. The CEH commission determined that
genocide had been committed, paving the way for a possible indictment of Rios Montt or
General Lucas Garcia (in addition to significant military officers during their administrations) for
crimes against humanity in an international criminal court. Moreover, perpetrators of genocide
were exempt from the 1996 Law of National Reconciliation, meaning that upon reforms and
improved independence of the judiciary, trials could convict these abusers at home in Guatemala.
Finally, the evidence collected by the Salvadoran TC and the Guatemalan CEH can be utilized in
criminal court cases against perpetrators now and in the future.

Finally, the Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification and the Commission on the
Truth for El Salvador have clarified the history of these countries’ recent pasts. They have
consolidated and analyzed the causes, aspects, and outcomes of that painful history and obligated
the country to face these facts and real experiences, rather than forget about them. National
reconciliation is only as strong as the nation’s weakest link: the victims. The TC and CEH
demonstrate this emphasis on the victims through the value they placed on the victims’
testimonies in order to shape a deeper account of history. In response to this truth, the TC and
CEH recommendations, made by impartial, legitimate authorities, identified what the country
should work towards — reconciliation — and articulated specific measures to get there.
Purposefully, these are challenging, comprehensive, even idealistic goals. Considering that
reconciliation is a long process, these ambitious recommendations were not solely written for the
short term. Conscious of the longevity of the process, the TC and CEH recommendations each
give a framework to follow far into the future and by which to objectively assess the course of
progress towards the ultimate goal: national reconciliation.
1 Marc Forget. “Crime as Interpersonal Conflict,” in  Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts, eds. Carol A.
Prager and Trudy Govier (Waterloo, Ontario, Canada: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2003), 125.
2 David A. Crocker, “Truth Commissions, Transitional Justice, and Civil Society,” in  Truth vs. Justice, ed. Robert
Rothberg and Dennis Thompson (Princeton: Princeton University Publishers, 2000) 108.
3 Ibid, 108.
4 Ibid, 108.
5 Mark Osiel. Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the Law.  (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction
Publishers), 1997.
6 Crocker, “Truth Commissions, Transitional Justice, and Civil Society,” 108.
Louis Kreisberg, “Changing Forms of Coexistence” in Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence: Theory and
Practice, ed. Mohammed Abu-Nimer (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001), 48.
8
Forget, 132.
9 David A. Crocker, “Reckoning with Past Wrongs,” in  Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts, eds. Carol
A. Prager and Trudy Govier (Waterloo, Ontario, Canada: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2003), 41.
1° Susan Dwyer, “Reconciliation for Realists,” in Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts, eds. Carol A.
Prager and Trudy Govier (Waterloo, Ontario, Canada: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2003), 93.
9611 Ibid, 93.
12 Ibid, 95.
13 Nigel Biggar, “Making Peace or Doing Justice: Must We Choose?” in Burying the Past: Making Peace and Doing
Justice After Civil Conflict, ed. Nigel Biggar (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2003) 5.
14
Tuomas Forsberg, “The Philosophy and Practice of Dealing with the Past: Some Conceptual and Normative
Issues” in Burying the Past: Making Peace and Doing Justice After Civil Conflict,  ed. Nigel Biggar (Washington,
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2003), 73.
15 Carol A. Prager, Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts,  (Waterloo, Ontario, Canada: Wilfred Laurier
University Press, 2003), 15.
16 Crocker, “Reckoning with Past Wrongs,” 44.
17 Ibid, 45; Audrey R. Chapman and Patrick Ball, “The Truth of Truth Commissions: Comparative Lessons from
Haiti, South Africa, and Guatemala,” Human Rights Quarterly, 23 (2001) 11.
18 Chapman and Ball, 4.
19 Christian Tomuschat. “Clarification Commission in Guatemala,”  Human Rights Quarterly, 23 (2001) 237.
20 Genevieve Jacques. Beyond Impunity: An Ecumenical Approach to Truth, Justice and Reconciliation.  (Geneva:
World Council of Churches, 2000), 29.
21 Michelle Parlevliet. “Telling the Truth in the Wake of Mass Violence.”
http://www.x4all.nl/-conflic1/pbp/part1/3  tellin.htm, 2/13/2004, para 7.
22 Ibid, 19.
23 Ibid, 19.
24 As cited in Jacques, 20.
25 Forsberg, 74. This was the motto for the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1995-2000.
26
Ibid, 74.
27 Govier, Trudy. “What is acknowledgement and why is it important?”  Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and
Concepts. (Waterloo, Ontario, Canada: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2003), 71.
28
Jeremy Sarkin. “The Necessity and Challenges of Establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in
Rwanda” Human Rights Quarterly, 21 (1999), 799.
29 Ibid, 17.
30 Crocker, “Truth Commissions, Transitional Justice, and Civil Society,” 102.
31 Biggar, 7.
32 Martha Minow. Between Vengeance and Forgiveness.  (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), 92.
33 Avruch, Kevin and Beatriz Vejarano, “Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: A Review Essay and Annotated
Bibliography,” OJPCR: The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution  4.2 (2002), 37.
34
Jennifer Schirmer. “Whose Testimony? Whose truth? Where are the Armed Actors in the Stoll-Menchil
Controversy?” Human Rights Quarterly, 25 (2003), 62.
35 Chapman, and Ball, 3.
36 Crocker, “Truth Commissions, Transitional Justice, and Civil Society,” 101.
37 Chapman and Ball, 4.
38 Sarkin, 803.
39 Hayner, 24-31.
4° Ibid, 16.
41 Ibid, 18.
42 Biggar, 9.
43 Ibid, 16.
44 Jacques, 16.
45 Thomas Buergenthal, “The United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador.” Neil Kritz, ed.  Transitional
Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of
Peace Press, 1995), vol. I “General Considerations,” 321.
46 Jacques, 28.
47 Ibid, 28.
48 John Paul Lederach, “Civil Society and Reconciliation,” in Turbulent Peace, ed. Chester Crocker, Fen Osler
Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 842.
49 Kimberley A. Maynard, “Rebuilding Community: psychosocial Healing, Reintegration, and Reconciliation at the
Grassroots Level,” in Rebuilding Societies After Civil War,  ed. Krishna Kumar (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1997) 210.
9750 Jonathan D. Tepperman, “Truth and Consequences.” Foreign Affairs 81 (March/April 2002), 133.
51 Crocker, “Truth Commissions, Transitional Justice, and Civil Society,” 103.
52 As cited in Hayner, 128.
53 Crocker, “Truth Commissions, Transitional Justice, and Civil Society,”, 103.
54 Sarkin, 801.
55 Ibid, 803.
56 Tomuschat, 236.
” Jacques, 22.
58 Patricia Hayner. Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocities.  (New York: Routledge, 2001), 36.
59 Ibid, 33.
60 “El Salvador: Mexico Peace Agreements - Provisions Creating the Commission on Truth.” U.N. Doc. S/25500
(April 1, 1993) reprinted in Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes  vol. III,
Ed., Neil J. Kritz. Washington, D.C.: United States Peace Institute Press, 1995. 174-6.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Mike Kaye. “The Role of Truth Commission in the Search for Justice, Reconciliation, and Democratisation: The
Salvadoran and Honduran Cases.” Journal of Latin American Studies, 29.3 (Oct. 1997), 699.
64 Beurgenthal, 296.
65 “El Salvador: Mexico Peace Agreements - Provisions Creating the Commission on Truth,” 1993.
66 Handy, Jim. Gift of the Devil. South End Press (U.S.A., 1984), 149.
67 “Agreement on the establishment of the Commission to clarify past human rights violations and acts of violence
that have caused the Guatemalan population to suffer.” http://www.usip.org/library/pa/guatemala/guat  940623.html,
3/28/2004.
68 Ibid, 3/28/2004.
69 Ibid, 3/28/2004.
70 Ibid, 3/28/2004.
71 Ibid, 3/28/2004.
72 Chapman and Ball, 33.
73 Sarkin, 808.
74 Beurgenthal, 303.
75 Ibid, 301.
76 Ibid, 302.
77 Ibid, 303-4.
78 Ibid, 304.
79 Ibid, 301.
80 Ibid, 304.
81 Tomuschat, 238.
82 “Agreement on the establishment of the Commission to clarify past human rights violations and acts of violence
that have caused the Guatemalan population to suffer.” http://www.usip.org/library/pa/guatemala/guat  940623.html,
3/28/2004.
83 Tomuschat, 241.
84 Chapman and Ball, 17.
85 Ibid, 20.
86 Ibid, 17.
87 Ibid, 28.
88 Greg Grandin. “Chronicles of a Guatemalan Genocide Foretold: Violence, trauma, and the Limits of Historical
Inquiry.” Nepantla: Views from the South 1.2 (2000) 392.
89 Ibid, 397.
90 Ibid, 392.
91
Mark Ensalaco. “Truth Commissions for Chile and El Salvador: a Report and Assessment.” Human Rights
Quarterly, v16 n4 (Nov 1994) 657. from From Madness to Hope, supra note 7, at 19.
92 Ibid, 657.
93
From Madness to Hope: the 12-year war in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador,
1993. http://www.usip.org/library/tc/doc/reports/el salvador/tc es 03151993 casesD1 2.html#D2, 4/11/04.
9894 “El Salvador: Mexico Peace Agreements - Provisions Creating the Commission on Truth,” 1993.
95 Tomuschat, 239.
96 Ibid, 239.
97 Ibid, 240.
98 Chapman and Ball, 24.
99
Seils, 36.
100 /bid, 36.
101 Tomuschat, 242.
102 Seils, 37.
103 “Strategic Choices in the Design of Truth Commissions: Design Factors: Proceedings,”
http://www.truthcommission.org/factor.php?fid=5&mode=m&lang=en , 2/15/04.
104
Chapman and Ball, 24.
105 Beurgenthal, 298.
106 “Strategic Choices in the Design of Truth Commissions: Design Factors: Dissemination of Findings,”
http://www.truthcommission.org/factor.php?fid=7&mode=m&lang=en , 2/15/04.
107 Beurgenthal, 294.
108 Ibid, 294.
109 Ibid, 294.
110 Document annexed to the Mexico Accords, April 27, 1991. Quoted in ComisiOn de la Verdad para El Salvador,
De la locura a la esperanza: La guerra de 12 alios en El Salvador  (San Salvador, 1993), 261.
“Agreement on the establishment of the Commission to clarify past human rights violations and acts of violence
that have caused the Guatemalan population to suffer.” Peace Agreements Digital Collection: Guatemala, United
States Institute for Peace Library, http://www.usip.org/library/pa/guatemala/guat  940623.html, 3/28/2004.
112 Tomuschat, 246.
113 “Agreement on the establishment of the Commission to clarify past human rights violations and acts of violence
that have caused the Guatemalan population to suffer.” Peace Agreements Digital Collection: Guatemala, United
States Institute for Peace Library,  http://www.usip.org/library/pa/guatemala/guat  940623.html, 3/28/2004.
114
Tomuschat, 249.
115 Ibid, 249.
116 Ibid, 250.
117 Beurgenthal, 303.
118 Ibid, 298.
119 Chapman and Ball, 30; and “Agreement on the establishment of the Commission to clarify past human rights
violations and acts of violence that have caused the Guatemalan population to suffer.” Peace Agreements Digital
Collection: Guatemala, United States Institute for Peace Library,
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/guatemala/guat  940623.html, 3/28/2004; and Neil J. Kritz, ed. Transitional Justice:
How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace
Press, 1995), vol. III, Laws, Rulings, and Reports, 175.
120 Beurgenthal, 298, 303.
121
Ibid, 299.
122
Ibid, 299.
123 Tomuschat, 252.
124 r •
Dia 252.
125 Ibid, 252.
126 Strategic Choices in the Design of Truth Commissions: Background Cases: El Salvador,”
http://www.truthcommission.org/commission.php?lang=en&cid=2&case.x=38&case.y=6 . 2/15/04.
127 Beurgenthal, 302.
128
Ibid, 317.
129 Chapman and Ball, 24.
130 Class presentation by Marco Tulio and Juan RamOn Donado from the Guatemalan Forensic Anthropology
Foundation, April 8, 2004. Latin American and Iberian Studies Class, Haverford College. Haverford, Pennsylvania.
131 Chapman and Ball, 24.
132 Ibid, 24.
99133 Guatemala: Never Again! Recovery of Historical Memory Project, The Official Report of the Human Rights
Office, Archdiocese of Guatemala. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1999.
134 Chapman and Ball, 25.
135 Tomuschat, 248.
136 Ibid, 248.
137 Ibid, 248.
138 Ibid, 248.
139 Ibid, 248.
14° Ibid, 246.
141
Ibid, 246.
142 Ibid,

246.
143 Chapman and Ball, 37.
144 Ibid, 37.
145 Ibid, 38.
146 Ibid, 38.
147 Ibid, 38.
148
Kaye, 812.
149 Beurgenthal, 301 quoting From Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador: Report of the Commission
on the Truth for El Salvador, S/25500, 1993, supra note 1, at 43.
15° Sarkin, 812.
151 Beurgenthal, 296.
152 Kaye, 700, and Sarkin, 812.
153 Kaye701.
154 Ibid, 701.
155 Hayner, 39.
156 Ensalaco, 659.
157 Ibid, 658 from From Madness to Hope,  supra note 7, at 192.
158 Beurgenthal, 301 quoting From Madness to Hope, supra note 1, at 25.
159 Report of the Chilean National Commission of truth and Reconciliation, page xxxii. Quoted in Kaye, 701
16° Kaye, 701.
161 Beurgenthal, 301.
162 r •
ma 301.
163 Ibid, 301.
164 Ibid, 300.
165 Ibid, 300.
166
Ibid, 325.
167 Chapman and Ball, 25.
168 Tomuschat, 253.
169 Chapman and Ball, 14.
17° Ibid, 33.
171 Guatemala: Memory of Silence: Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification: Conclusions and
Recommendations, “Conclusions.” United Nations Office of Project Services, 1999.
http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/recs3.html  , 1/28/04.
172 Chapman and Ball, 33.
173 Chapman and Ball, 33.
174 Chapman and Ball, 33.
175 Chapman and Ball, 13.
176 Guatemala: Memory of Silence: Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification: Conclusions and
Recommendations, “Conclusions.” United Nations Office of Project Services, 1999.
http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/recs3.html , 1/28/04, 80.
177 Ensalaco, 658 from From Madness to Hope,  supra note 7, at 191.
178 UN Security Council Annex, From Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador: Report of the
Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, S/25500, 1993, 172-187 posted on USIP Library,
http://www.usip.org/library/tc/doc/reports/el  sal vador/tc es 03151993 V.html  , 1/28/04.
179 Ibid, 1/28/04.
100180 Ibid, 1/28/04.
181 Ibid, 1/28/04.
182 Ensalaco, 659.
183 Guatemala: Memory of Silence: Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification: Conclusions and
Recommendations, “Recommendations.” United Nations Office of Project Services, 1999.
http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/recs3.html  , 1/28/04.
184 Tomuschat, 253.
185 Guatemala: Memory of Silence: Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification: Conclusions and
Recommendations, “Recommendations.” United Nations Office of Project Services, 1999.
http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/recs3.html  , 1/28/04.
186 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 42.
187 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 42.
188 Popkin, Margaret. Peace Without Justice: Obstacles to Building the Rule of Law in El Salvador. University Park,
PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press (2000), 160 citing Address to the nation, March 18, 1993; quoted in
IACHR, El Salvador Report (1994), 70.
189 Kaye, 705-6.
190 Ibid, 705. Quoted from Americas Watch, El Salvador - Accountability and Human Rights: The Report of the
United Nations Commission on the Truth for El Salvador (New York, 1993), 9-10.
191 Strategic Choices in the Design of Truth Commissions: Design Factors: Dissemination of Findings,”
http://www.truthcommission.org/factor.php?fid=7&mode=m&lang=en . 2/15/04.
192 Ibid, 2/15/04.
193 Beurgenthal, 319.
194
Popkin, Margaret. Peace Without Justice: Obstacles to Building the Rule of Law in El Salvador. University Park,
PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press (2000), 159.
195 Beurgenthal, 319.
196 Chapman and Ball, 34.
197 Seils, 42.
198 Grandin, 408.
199 Ibid, 408 as referenced from radio broadcast, Noti-7, 25 February 1999.
200
Ibid, 408.
201
Ibid, 408.
202 Tomuschat, Christian. “Clarification Commission in Guatemala.”  Human Rights Quarterly, v23 (2001) 253.
203 Ibid, 253.
204 Seils, 43.
205 Ibid, 43.
206 Grandin, 408 from Prensa Libre. 26 March, 1999.
207 Ibid, 408 from Siglo Veintiuno, 1 March 1999.
208 Strategic Choices in the Design of Truth Commissions: Background Cases: El Salvador,”
http://www.truthcommission.org/commission.phOlang=en&cid=2&case.x=38&case.y=6  . 2/15/04.
209
Popkin, 161.
210 Kaye, 706.
211
Popkin, 160.
212 “Amnesty International: El Salvador: 2003 Summary”  http://web.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/print/s1v-summary-
eng, 4/7/2004.
213 “El Salvador: Monument to Memory adn Truth - dignifying the victims of armed conflict,” Amnesty
International Public Statement, December 12, 2003. http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAMR290112003,
4/7/2004.
214
Ibid, 4/7/2004.
215 Ibid, 4/7/2004.
216 Strategic Choices in the Design of Truth Commissions: Background Cases: El Salvador,”
http://www.truthcommission.org/commission.php?lana=en&cid=2&case.x=38&case.y=6  . 2/15/04.
217 Kaye, 704.
218 Kaye, 704.
219 Hertvick, Nicole. “El Salvador: Effecting Change from Within.” UN Chronicle, v39 i3 (Sept-Nov 2002), 75.
220 Kaye, 705.
101221 Kaye, 705.
222 Kaye, 705.
223
Kaye, 704.
224 Kaye, 705.
225 Strategic Choices in the Design of Truth Commissions: Background Cases: El Salvador,”
http://www.truthcommission.org/commission.php?lang=en&cid=2&case.x=38&case.y=6 . 2/15/04.
226 “Amnesty International: El Salvador: 2003 Summary”  hap://web.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/print/sIv-summary-
eng, 4/7/2004.
227 Ibid, 4/7/2004.
228
Ibid, 4/7/2004.
229
Popkin, 161.
230 Tomuschat, 255.
231 Ibid, 255.
232 Seils„ 44.
233 Tomuschat, 255.
234 Seils, 44.
235 Ibid, 44.
236 Ibid, 44 citing interview with Alfredo Balsells Tojo in  El Periodico (30 June 2001).
237 Ibid, 44.
238 Ibid, 44.
239 Ibid, 45.
240 Tomuschat, 254.
241
Ibid, 254.
242
Ibid, 254. reference to CEH, Tomo VI, supra note 1, at 397.
243 “Guatemala Massacre Compensation,” BBC News Online, Wednesday, December 12, 2001.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/americas/1703601.stm , 4/7/2004.
244
Tomuschat, 254 referenceing Elder Interiano, Plantearan denuncia contra Lucas Garcia, Prensa Libre, 2 May
2000.
245 “Deep Cause for Concern. Amnesty International’s Assessment of the current human rights situation in
Guatemala,” Amnesty International. http:/web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAMR340222003  . 1/31/2004.
246
•
ID1C1 1/31/2004.
247 Seils, 45.
248
Ibid, 45.
249 Chapman and Ball, 36.
250 Ibid, 36.
251 Ibid, 36.
252 Ibid, 36.
253 Ibid, 36.
254 Ibid, 36.
255 Strategic Choices in the Design of Truth Commissions: Design Factors: Dissemination of Findings,”
http://www.truthcommission.org/factor.php?fid=7&mode=m&lang=en . 2/15/04.
256 Ibid, 2/15/04.
257 Ibid, 2/15/04.
258
Popkin, 159.

It is clear that civil society can have a substantial effect in pushing along the reconciliation
process outlined by a truth commission report. Civil society and the truth can have an intimate,
reciprocal relationship of building each other’s legitimacy: once the official truth is out, civil
society can use this information to teach and organize people under the banner of truth and
towards the recommendations in the truth report. Using the official truth will empower civil
society, strengthen the organizations, and, in turn, further the campaign to implement the truth
commission’s recommendations for reconciliation. It is essential that the truth not only be
established by the truth commission, but that it reaches the people and civil society. Therefore,
distribution of the truth commission report and dissemination of the truth uncovered by the
commission can significantly affect the implementation — whether by the government or by civil
society — of the recommendations on which reconciliation hinges. Successful, wide
dissemination of the truth and of the commission’s report, will help the people learn about and
learn from them. It builds people’s sense of ownership of this truth. It makes them feel invested
in the vision of the recommendations. Wide distribution as well as targeted allocation is optimal
in order to execute broad education and guarantee that the centers. It is especially those public
90centers of assembly (community groups, human rights organizations, universities, houses of
worship, etc.) that must obtain first-hand access to this information and use it to promote the
rights of the citizens and beneficial change.
The CEH developed a public dissemination strategy for the truth it revealed in its report.
Forty-two thousand copies of the CEH’s recommendations and conclusions in Spanish and
English were distributed on the first day. In addition, the full text version was placed on the
internet immediately. Upon its publication, the final report was distributed in its entirety to the
press, universities, and libraries. 249 The following Sunday, major newspapers printed
supplements and important excerpts from the report. 25° A week after its presentation, the report
had its own permanent website site with its link publicized on other websites and in
newspapers. 251
Five months later in July, 1999, the first five complete volumes were published; the seven
supplemental annex volumes were published three months later in October. 252 Rather than use a
private sector publisher as did the South African TRC, the CEH used a public sector publisher,
UN Office of Project Services (UNOPS), which has widened and facilitated the circulation of the
report’s findings. 253 UNOPS has been very generous in facilitating the report’s educational
effect. It has given away tens of thousands of summary versions, donated hundreds of the
complete volumes of the report to schools, libraries, and NGOs, and funded, along with AAAS,
the making of a CD ROM copy of the entire Memoria del Silencio report. 254
Unfortunately, the Salvadoran Truth Commission did not have an elaborate plan of
distribution of its report like the Guatemalan CEH. National media coverage of the Truth
Commission and of the truth it established was very sparse due to strict censorship. News of the
Salvadoran truth commission was said to have reached many international sites better than it was
91reported inside the country. 255 Copies of the report were given immediately to both Parties of the
Peace accord and truth commission negotiations. The report itself was published in Spanish and
in English and was distributed very limitedly.
256
Access to the report was moderate — through
human rights organizations or public institutions. 257 The report is not required reading in their
schools, especially as history is not studied to any great degree in the Salvadoran school
system. 258 The Guatemalan school systems do not include their CEH report in the school
curriculum, either. This is one clear way that the State could, if it wanted to, emphasize truth and
orient children at an early age in the direction of reconciliation.

The December 1996 “Law for National Reconciliation” ironically granted amnesty from
crimes committed during the conflict, except for crimes of genocide, forced disappearance, and
torture. It was critical, then, that the CEH proved that genocide had been committed in
Guatemala. It provided hope that those responsible could still be tried. Unfortunately, however,
88there have been no legal consequences for the genocide committed.
240
As a signatory of the
Genocide Convention of 1948, the State of Guatemala is required to prosecute cases of genocide
against responsible persons inside their state territory.
241
The Guatemalan judicial system
remains weak. At the time of the CEH publication, only one proceeding was pending.242 This
was the case of the horrifying 1982 massacre at Las Dos Erres, where nearly 300 people had
been killed, mostly women and children. The proceedings have never been completed; however
President Portillo offered $1.8 million dollars in compensation to the families in a ceremony of
apology in December of 2001. 243
Civil society has pushed public prosecutor’s office to take up several cases. On May
3rd
2000, forty-eight survivors of massacres in the Baja Verapaz and Quiche departments filed a
complaint against the former President Romeo Lucas Garcia, his brother Benedicto Lucas
Garcia, and Luis Rene Mendoza Palomo, the former Chief Commander of the Army and former
Minister of Defense. 244 Human rights organizations and families of the victims, rather than the
State, have pushed forward the trials of the 1990 extrajudicial execution of Myrna Mack and of
Bishop Juan Jose Gerardi in 1998. 245 The military officers accused of the crimes were convicted
but now are pending appeals. 246
Due to Guatemala’s weak justice system, legal proceedings outside of the country have
provided the most hope. The Spanish Audencia Nacional on March 27th, 2000 against former
head of State Rios Montt. (Nobel Prize Winner) When Rigoberta Menchil submitted the factual
evidence of the ineffectiveness of the Guatemalan judicial system, the Spanish judge felt
motivated to start an investigation.
The recommendations that address reform of the Guatemalan army constitute nearly twenty
percent247 of the eighty-four included in the CEH report, making it a pivotal issue for
89implementation progress. As mentioned above, the eradication of the presidential military staff  —
Estado Mayor Presidencial — was critical as it would get rid of one of the major sources of
human rights violations in Guatemala. President Portillo had begun the process of dismembering
this military body when a few months later he suddenly decided against it. He was, no doubt,
pressured to do so “as a hostage to the militarized past.” 248

The Foundation for Peace and Harmony was never created according to the recommended
procedure in the CEH. Instead, President Portillo bypassed the legislative approval process in
2001 to announce the establishment of the Commission for Peace and Harmony, as an executive
body. 234 Its purpose and responsibilities were supposedly the same as that of the proposed
Foundation for Peace and Harmony, except for an essential element. This “commission” was an
executive-created body, rather than legislative-created one, which meant that the Congress had
no power to check or monitor this new commission’s progress or efficacy. 235 With no budgetary
provision provided it and a weakened mandate compared to that originally proposed for the
recommendations follow-up body in the CEH, the Commission for Peace and Harmony has
functionally remained an empty commission that exists in name only. Former truth
commissioner, Alfredo Ballsels has dismissed the commission as “a meaningless appendix to the
already penniless Peace Secretariat.” 236 Nearly all human rights organizations have also rejected
this commission’s creation. Its existence perpetuates the government’s façade as one that cares
about the CEH and reconciliation. As long as this false commission remains nominally in place,
its mere existence will preclude a truly effective commission from being created for the
implementation of the CEH recommendations towards reconciliation.
During his presidency, Portillo did fulfill the symbolic recommendation for reconciliation
that specified creating a national holiday for remembrance of the victims. It is called the ‘Day of
Dignity for victims.’ 237 This measure for national reconciliation presents virtually no political
risk; it does not involve the president or politicians having to confess their own partial or
substantial fault for the fact that there are so many victims.
Portillo also sought and accepted pardon for the Guatemalan State regarding the conflict’s
human rights violations for which is was directly or indirectly responsible.
238
However, the
87manner in which this “apology” sought forgiveness from the victimized and immediately
assumed it, before they had a say in this process, demonstrates disingenuous motives. Thus, it is
clearly a political move, part of the “forgive and forget” approach that lets politicians write off
real, painful, complicated, but necessary truth-exposing, victim remembrance, and justice
initiatives.
To this day there has been no move whatsoever on the establishment of a reparations
program for the victims and victims’ families. During the last several years, a National Congress
led by former dictator Rios Montt has ensured that the legislature would not propose any such
financial fund or social program. The government claims that there is no money for a
reparations program, yet it lets the rich elite enjoy their extremely low income tax rate of seven
percent or less per year.
Luckily there seems to be some progress in the governments’ direct, complementary
involvement in the nation-wide campaign to exhume the remains of conflict victims from
clandestine graves. Guatemala has three principal NGOs that conduct exhumations and the
government has begun to develop its own forensic team to act in support of the NGOs’ work.
This step is a favorable sign, provided that the government-sponsored team remains independent
of party interests and focused on victims’ social, psychological, and legal needs. 239

During his campaign for the presidency, Alonso Portillo of the FRG (Rios Montt’s infamous
party) declared that he would make his best effort to carry out the recommendations of the
CEH,23° a surprising departure from the usual party line. Later, when he won in 1999, he
appointed Otilia Lux de Cotf, one of the CEH’s three commission members, to his cabinet. 231
During his inauguration speech he stated publicly that he supported the CEH report and affirmed
his commitment to carry out its recommendations. 232 Although his early rhetoric and apparent
willingness to work with ‘the other sides’ were important, auspicious gestures, Portillo paid
minimal attention to implementing the CEH recommendations during his actual full term.
Although others felt encouraged that Otilia Lux de Coil could serve as a watchdog from her
cabinet position to monitor the implementation of CEH recommendations, 233 she was not able to
put pressure on the President and administration as hoped.

There has been some progress in the purging of the corrupt rights abusers in the military and
public service who appeared on both the TC’s list of perpetrators and on the Ad Hoc’s list of
recommended individuals for dismissa1. 216 These officers appeared first on the list of the Ad
Hoc Commission and, thus, the Ad Hoc Commission, rather than the TC, is primarily credited
for applying pressure to the institution for their removal.
83While the Truth Commission was at work, the Ad Hoc Commission, charged with
conducting investigations deep inside the military, came out with its report and a sweeping call
to purge 103 officers from the institution. By the time the Truth Commission report was
released, several perpetrators it named already appeared on the Ad Hoc Commission’s list.
However, the Truth Commission report was crucial in increasing the pressure on President
Cristiani to confront the military regarding the remaining fifteen high command officers from the
Ad Hoc’s list and finally dismiss them. 217 President Cristiani informed the United Nations in
July of 1993 that every individual named in the Ad Hoc report would be removed by the end of
1993, including infamous figures like Generals Ponce, Zepeda, Rubio, and Vargas who had
already resigned or been dismissed. 218
Despite the initial encouraging removal of these generals from the military, many of the
perpetrators named in From Madness to Hope have retained high-level governmental
positions. 219 The legislature failed to follow the Truth Commission’s recommendation to draft
into law a ten-year ban from any public or political position for individuals found responsible in
its conclusions for egregious breaches of human rights.
220
Consequently, soon after losing their
military positions for participating in the murders of several civilian mayors, Joaquin Villalobos
became leader of the Partido Democrata and Ana Guadalupe Martinez secured her seat as Vice
President of the Legislative Assembly. 221 In the same way, former defense minister, General
Ponce, was appointed head of the AdministraciOn Nacional de Telecomunicaciones, and
Mauricio Gutierrez won nomination to the OAS Inter-American Judicial Committee.
222
The fact
that these gross offenders were handed replacement positions by a government that purported to
pursue reconciliation, directly undermined the meaning of reconciliation. The truth
commission’s intended punishment — removal from the military institution — was not allowed to
84be a manifestation of justice. Instead, it was merely a temporary inconvenience before the
government found new, equally lucrative and prominent, positions for them. For victims in wait
of reparations, social services, and basic recognition, this propping up of their perpetrators by a
government that claimed to be pro-reconciliation was another slap of injustice.
In addition to the troubling reappearance of old military faces wearing new hats of
responsibility, the removal of civilian officials from their positions has been slow-moving. In
fact, it was a more sluggish process than retiring corrupt officers from the military.
223
Mauricio
Gutierrez Castro, identified as having purposely obstructed justice in the El Mozote case,
remained President of the Supreme Court until July of 1994. 224
Impunity remains a severe obstruction to justice in El Salvador. There has not been one
conviction of an accused perpetrator. Cases for the murders of Monsignor Oscar Arnulfo
Romero y Galdamez5 , Ignacio Ellacuria, Armando Lopez Qunitana, Joaquin Lopez y Lopez,
Segundo Montes Mozo, Ignacio Martin Bar() and Juan Ram6n Moreno Pardo, and Elba Julia
Ramos and Celina Maricet Ramos have been left without resolution or punishment of
perpetrators. A coalition of NGOs together filed a case against high-ranking military and
civilian officers accused of ordering the infamous 1989 murder of the six Jesuit priests 6 with
their housekeeper and her daughter. 225 In 2001, the third Magistrate’s Court of San Salvador
dismissed all charges against them. 226 While impunity continues inside the country, a case in the
United States brought by three Salvadoran torture victims against two generals of the Salvadoran
military has brought flickers of hope to those in El Salvador.
227
The US court ruled in favor of
5 Violence against opponents by agents of the State, Death Squad Assassinations, Illustrative case #1. “Cases and
Patterns of Violence,” Death Squad Assassinations. From Madness to Hope: the 12-year war in El Salvador: Report
of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, 1993.
6 Violence against opponents by agents of the State, Illustrative case #1. “Cases and Patterns of Violence,” Death
Squad Assassinations. From Madness to Hope: the 12-year war in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on the
Truth for El Salvador, 1993.
85the Salvadoran victims and fined the defendants, all residents of the US, a punitive compensation
for the crimes and pain they had inflicted. 228
Unlike the active civil society of Guatemala, the lack of visible, vocal demand for justice
from the civil society sector in El Salvador has failed to put pressure on the government.
Salvadoran human rights groups severely lack technical resources and, therefore, the technical
capacity that helps organize and mobilize people, create a stronger network of NGOs, and
ultimately let demands be heard. 229

The report required the public apology to the victims for the crimes done to them, but there
has been no such move. Even two years after the Salvadoran Truth Commission report was
released, the new Defense Minister, General Humberto Corado, denied fault and reason for
concession to the victimized Salvadoran population: “The armed forces have nothing to
apologize for, since their conduct was consistent with the principles of a war in which a
clandestine enemy attacks regular military patrols. 9210 Margaret Popkin notes that “an official
acknowledgement of past wrongdoing by state agents is unlikely to come from the same
government responsible for many of those violations while it remains in power.
211
Though
three presidents and three elections have passed since the release of the TC report, the party in
82power has not changed since the beginning of the conflict in 1980. Each one of these presidents
was an ARENA party member, the party implicated in massive-scale abusive war policy.
Families have not been compensated through any reparations program. Salvadoran NGOs
have called for the government to provide medical assistance and to investigate disappearances
from the conflict but action has yet to be seen. 212
An important recent development honoring the memory and dignity of the victims of the
Salvadoran civil conflict is the recently constructed Monument to Memory and Truth in the
Parque Cuscatlan in the capital, San Salvador. 213 Inaugurated in 2003, it is an 85-meter wall of
black granite engraved with the names of more than 25,000 innocent girls, boys, women, and
men victims. The inscription reads: “A space for hope, where we can continue dreaming and
build a more just, human and equitable society.”
214
Unfortunately, the government did not take it
upon itself to build the national monument, as the TC recommendations had obliged it to do.
Instead, it was the Comite Pro Monumento de las V1ctimas Civlies de violaciones de Derechos
Humanos (Committee in favor of the Monument to the Civilian Victims of Human Rights
Violations), a conglomeration of twelve Salvadoran NGOs, that initiated the project and financed
the building of the monument. 215

EL SALVADOR: LIMITED PROGRESS
The TC recommendations were binding. However, binding obligation does not mean that
implementation has been smooth or complete. The UN was slow and not insistent enough to
81push for compliance with the TC recommendations as it gradually turned its attentions
elsewhere. Thus, the implementation of the recommendations has largely been left up to the
Parties and El Salvador’s very weak civil society. The FMLN had advocated for the truth
commission during the negotiations, but retreated somewhat, to the level of the government’s
compliance, once the Commission report was finalized and the recommendations were out on the
table. 208
Despite the fact that eleven years have passed since the TC report was presented to the
public, only a few of the recommendations have actually been implemented. The Salvadoran
government has been much more reluctant to implement punitive measures of administrative
sanctions or bans on individuals named in the report, and measures specifically for national
reconciliation, than to carry out structural and institutional reforms. 209

As in the case of El Salvador, Guatemalan society’s various reactions to the February 25,
1999 presentation of the CEH report would set the tone for the post-Commission process of
acknowledgment, healing, and justice-seeking. “The success of the CEH rests…uniquely on the
reception and impact of the report because it was the Guatemalan commission’s only product.” 196
The reactions would identify real or false commitment to reconciliation and acceptance of the
nation’s essential needs. Even more, the degree of congruence between public and government
reactions would determine Guatemalans’ own personal degree of hope for national
reconciliation.
The CEH report “far exceeded the expectations of civil society,” which was especially
excited about the Commission’s conclusion that genocide had occurred and its pointed
encouragement of trials with the urgent reform of the judiciary.
197
Unfortunately, reactions from
civilian government officials were mixed. The Arai government did not accept the CEH report.
During the official presentation of Memoria del silencio in Guatemala City’s
National Theater on 25 February 1999, victims, their relatives, and members of
popular and human rights organizations greeted each conclusion with clamorous
applause. Guatemala’s president, Alvaro Arza, his close advisors, and military
officers, however, appeared stunned. Arai did not personally receive the report,
instead delegating the government’s secretary of peace to the stage. Following
the presentation, he exited through a back door without comment. 198
Immediately following the presentation, Raquel Zelaya, the secretary of peace, remarked that the
commission’s work was commendable, yet reminded listeners that “those responsible for the
massacres will not be brought to justice.” 199 Roberto Robles, head of Guatemala’s official tourist
institute grumbled that such a negative portrayal of Guatemala would cause more “damage than
79reconciliation.” 200 The Minister of Defense, General Hector Barrios, responded to the report that
day by noting that the report was “a partial truth, since its version of history is nothing more than
the point of view of the commission.” 201 This slight of the commission’s credibility would
reappear later in a more pointed criticism of the CEH and “its truth.”
President Arzti s government finally responded publicly to the report on March 16th , 1999 in
a newspaper advertisement. 202 In this written address of the CEH report, President Arai, in
effect, excused the State of Guatemala for not having any responsibility to implement further
reforms. He denied even the need to acknowledge the victims and crimes against them in a
formal apology, explaining that on December 29th , 1998, the second anniversary of the signing of
the final Peace Agreement, he had already expressed some amount of regret. 203 This was clearly,
strategically timed before the release of the CEH report in order to “count” and so that any
apology following the report would not appear to be an endorsement of and submittal to the
report’s conclusions.
Arai, who had been garlanded the world over for the part he claimed in the
peace process, seriously set back the cause of reconciliation through his actions.
The clear rejection of the report, the creation of an ‘us and them’ reaction and
the simple churlishness of his behavior derailed serious comment on its findings
and set the tone for future discussion. 204
Four months after the publication of the CEH report, on June 30th, 1999, President Arzd declared
that that the report was wrong in proclaiming that genocide had occurred in Guatemala. 205
However, there’s no denying that massacres, disappearance, and forced displacement of
hundreds of thousands of indigenous Maya due to a systemized, targeting government and
military policy constituted genocide. The Arzii government’s negative responses amounted to a
rejection of the entire idea of the CEH report, leading to a most-significant re-polarization of the
country — this time not around the issue of the conflict, but around the issue of the truth of the
80past and reconciliation. Although it is disappointing to receive such a caustic reaction from the
State about the official truth commission’s work, a negative response was predictable.
Media coverage surrounding the release of the CEH report was active and intensive
nationally and internationally. Prominent opinion columnists in national newspapers such as
Prensa Libre and Siglo Veintiuno offered differing opinions that cut exactly along the lines of
political persuasion. Conservatives like Fernando Linares charged that the report was biased,
“an ideological instrument of the Left.” 206 A comment by Alfredo Klatsmitt demonstrated his
wary doubts that the report would be able to heal people and reconcile society: that it would
“open wounds in the memory of a people tormented by both sides.” 207 Disappointingly, the
report did not create a lively debate for very long. But the fact that interest in the report, shown
through coverage in the media, subsided relatively soon is not altogether surprising. The fear
that the military still perpetuated and the secrecy surrounding circles of political dissent or
government criticism demonstrate the personal risk involved in carrying on a public dialogue
(via the press) that upheld the incriminating CEH conclusions of, primarily, the military.
Only a few months after the presentation of the CEH report, the country elected Portillo, of
Efrain Rios Montt’s FRG party, into presidential office