One of the unique strengths of the Salvadoran TC report was that it dared to name
perpetrators. It is one of only two truth commissions 153 that can be admired for such firmness and
courage. “Approximately eighty individuals were named for either planning, committing, or
covering up human rights violations. Those who were named included roughly a dozen
members of the FMLN as well as several civilians, but the vast majority were members of the
armed forces or security forces.” 154 Surprisingly, the military had originally asked the TC to
identify the problematic, corrupt, individuals inside the institution. It believed that the Truth
Commission had been created weak enough that it would be able to ascertain only minimal
incriminating evidence to identify a few token, low-ranked individuals. The military’s principle
motive was to preserve its prestigious, honorable image. Therefore, it strategically decided that it
would blame military brutality on a handful of culpable members, while maintaining the
institution as guiltless. The TC final report conclusions were, however, damning for the military
as an entire institution. Over forty of those named were senior members of the military,
judiciary, and armed opposition, 155 which demonstrated the need to go beyond purging a few
“bad apple” individuals to reform the military institution.
Even where guilty parties were not directly penalized with dismissal, the blow to
personal reputation and to institutional prestige was appreciable… The
unprecedented act of identifying those who had only been rumored to be
involved with the Salvadoran death squads, like the trial of soldiers implicated
in the November 1989 murder of six Jesuits, their housekeeper, and her
daughter, has opened another breach in the wall of impunity… The truth
commission took “[a] step towards justice — the truth, but not punishment.” 56
65Naming names was an important punitive, although not legal, measure. Due to the fact that it
had no judicial powers to legally convict and punish perpetrators, naming their names in the
report in an undeniable, factual declaration of responsibility was the most it could do to
contribute to stopping impunity. Publicly naming names would amount to a punishment of
moral castigation. In addition to establishing the truth of the violence, the mandate stated that
the TC would “clarify and put an end to any indication of impunity on the part of officers of the
armed forces, particularly in cases where respect for human rights is jeopardized.” 157 The TC
saw impunity as an obstruction of justice that would prevent healing of the victims and
jeopardize reconciliation, one of the explicitly stated purposes of the Commission in its mandate.
In this way, the TC courageously sought to address the problem of impunity in a way that was
never done before and to help pave the way to reconciliation.
The commissioners never once questioned naming those perpetrators for whom they had
built up overwhelming or substantial evidence from a variety of sources. The truth commission
report, Madness to Hope, justified its reasoning: “Not to name names would be to reinforce the
very impunity to which the Parties instructed the Commission to put an end.” 158 They assumed it
was a part of their fundamental duty to establish the factual truth surrounding the crimes
committed and the nature of the violence of the country’s bloody 12-year civil conflict. A truth
commissioner, Thomas Beurgenthal, explained, “In our view, national reconciliation would be
harmed rather than helped by a Commission report that told only part of the truth.”
The naming of names of perpetrators was extremely controversial. The Salvadoran Truth
Commission was aware of opposing opinions held by prominent figures such as Jose Zalaquett, a
commissioner on Chile’s National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation. Chile’s
Commission had chosen not to name names of perpetrators they had identified. Zalaquett
66explained in the Chilean Truth and Reconciliation Commission report that, “To name culprits
who had not defended themselves and were not obliged to do so would have been the moral
equivalent to convicting someone without due process.’
,159
In response to such arguments that
would disapprove of a so-called over-stepping of truth commissions’ juridical bounds, it should
be emphasized that “…the publication of names represents a de facto rather than a de jure
pronouncement of guilt.” 16° In defense of the decision to name names, the TC was never
presumptuous in this role. The commission knew many thousands of names, but reduced it to a
small pool of the most sin-drenched high command officials of the government and military. In
order to evaluate the extent of their evidence, the TC set up three categories of proof:
overwhelming evidence, substantial evidence, and sufficient evidence.
161
Any person named in
the report had to belong to either the overwhelming or substantial evidence groups.
162
The
Commission’s policy was to give any individual to be named an opportunity to rebut the charges
and let their story be heard by the commission prior to the publication of the name in the
report. 163 When the TC summoned individuals it suspected were guilty of or involved in
particular human rights violations for which they already had much evidence, the commissioner
or staff member to interview them would inform them of why they had been asked to come
before the commission, and give them the opportunity to ask questions or respond with any
statements they wished. 164 They were never given the names of their accusers or any
information that could reveal the identity of these witnesses4 . 165
Both Beurgenthal of the Salvadoran Commission and Zalaquett from the Chilean
Commission had strong, yet opposing, points of view regarding naming perpetrators in the
report. A truth commission’s decision must, therefore, be based on which option will best
4 This was done in order to ensure the safety of the accusers and witnesses. The TC’s mandate explicitly stated that
all procedures were to be conducted confidentially. The country was unfortunately not yet rid of violence and the
commission took care to protect the identities of their informants.
67support and stimulate reconciliation. The context of the truth commission in Chile was different
from that of the Salvadoran Commission, and, subsequently, the nature of each of their
reconciliation processes has differed as well. Thus, the contrasting methods of either inclusion
or omission of perpetrator names seemed the more or less appropriate given the distinct contexts
in Chile and El Salvador. The intention in both cases was the same: to trigger a reconciliation
process. Salvadoran Commissioner Beurgenthal explains:
…We believed that our mandate required us to name names and…in our
judgment this action would promote rather then impede national reconciliation
in El Salvador…How that story is told is less important than that it be told
truthfully. Hence, whether the names of the perpetrators are revealed, whether
trials are held, sanctions imposed, compensation awarded, or amnesties granted,
these are all considerations that may well depend upon the nature of the conflict,
the national character of the country, the political realities, and compromises
that produced the end of the conflict. But if the basic truth about the east is
suppressed, it will prove very difficult to achieve national reconciliation. 16
Naming names is a very context-specific decision. Whether reconciliation is best served by
revealing individual or institutional responsibility depends on the political realities and
social/cultural context and causes of the conflict.
Guatemala’s CEH was not granted the option of “individualizing” responsibility — in other
words, naming names of perpetrators. The inability to name names seems at first glance like a
disadvantage, especially considering the TC’s persuasive reasoning for including the names of
perpetrators. However, perhaps this is not the case considering that the strategy of the TC and
CEH reports towards healing and reconciliation differed. The TC report was very legalistic in
style, reflecting the belief that justice, including punitive versions, is necessary for reconciliation.
Morally denouncing human rights violations will finally empower the victims and raise their
dignity above that of the perpetrators. By examining a few individual cases in depth and
revealing names of key perpetrators, the report sought to condemn the acts committed. By
focusing on the acts, more latitude was given to society to reject such behavior and learn to
68reconcile with the people. In contrast, it was critical for the Guatemalan Commission to
establish the macro-truth: to make clear the guilt of the institutions that were infiltrated with
racist and supremacist attitudes and perpetuating the violence and injustice that caused such
suffering in Guatemala. Achieving a substantial level of national reconciliation would never
have promise in Guatemala unless the system and governmental institutions were made culpable
and underwent major overhaul reform.
The macro-level truth of the CEH looks at the root causes, the suffering of the indigenous
people under racist war policy, the brutality and culpability of the government and military
forces, and the guerrillas’ failure to protect the civilian population. This macro-truth is also
demonstrated in both the TC and the CEH with statistics and a comparative approach. 167 Such
macro-truth is most attuned to furthering national-level reconciliation, rather than micro-level,
individual reconciliation between particular victims and perpetrators or former enemies, for
which it has only limitedly potential.